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3Preface
In March 2008, I coordinated a roundtable conference at the Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs at Harvard University at which the Iraq Task Force convened an
expert advisory team to elaborate on the necessary steps for a responsible U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq.
The conference initially addressed the major problem of Iraq’s fundamental
communal divisiveness that may result in political fragmentation and a collapse of the
state. This divisiveness is particularly evident in the fact that the loyalty of many
people inside the Iraqi governing structures and security apparatus primarily belongs
to their communal group or militia and only secondarily to the nation and the nation´s
military. Accordingly, a majority of those in the state and military are strongly biased
toward their own communal groups and pursue only their narrow „identity group“
goals which puts the country at risk to fractionize along ethnic and religious lines.
Consequentially, the conference proposed a set of diplomatic, economic and political
measures that should accompany a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq to advance national
reconciliation and consent.1 According to their findings the national political
reconciliation process must be based on much stronger regional and UN cooperation
and involvement in stabilizing Iraq. Essential to building such positive, cooperative
regional involvement certainly is an end to U.S. occupation since the issue of
collaborating with the occupier constantly feeds tensions between communities and
parties within communities. Both the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal and building a
framework of UN/regional cooperation will be vital in bringing forward the national
reconciliation process. This will create a foundation for the necessary security sector
reform measures that will be subject of the following study.
Jessica von Felbert, German National Merit Foundation
December 20, 2008
1 Report of the Task Force for a responsible withdrawal from Iraq, 2008, June.
4A) Objectives and means
I) Objectives
This study focuses on contributing to a comprehensive optimization and
enhancement of the Iraqi military´s capacity and capability to effectuate stabilization
and reconciliation within the country.
Although the Iraqi military has made substantial progress in conducting
counterinsurgency operations since the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team
(CMATT) has started its redevelopment in 2004 it is not yet able to operate effectively
and still overreliant on Coalition support.2
Army, navy, and air force particularly lack the ability to sufficiently secure
Iraq´s borders from external threats. Syria and Iran are actively contributing to the
country’s instability as they incessantly endorse the inflow of subversives and the
proliferation of armament with which to support the insurgency campaign, and arms,
munitions, and foreign fighters come across the borders regularly. 3
Without additional support, the Iraqi military is also overstrained and inapt to
sweepingly secure Iraq´s provinces and protect its citizens, infrastructure, and
transportation arteries from massive insurgent and terrorist assaults.4 Although the
level of violence has overall declined, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains one of the most
significant threats, and its assaults are regarded to still have enormous destructive
and destabilizing potential. Even single victories such as in Basra, Mosul and Sadr
City, experts repeatedly accentuated, were only achieved due to extensive U.S.
engagement and paid insurgent support.5 Therefore, it is widely agreed that the Iraqi
military is currently not capable to detain the country´s internal threats independently.
In addition, the Iraqi military is known for being highly infiltrated by subversive
elements such as local milita members and foreign insurgents and is thus assessed
to be an unreliable force which without supervision is at risk to fractionize.6 Therefore,
the military is not just dependent on combat and border control support, but also
reliant on assistance to ensure the furtherance of its durable cohesion, assertiveness,
and integrity.
2 Cp. Farrell, S., Oppel, R., 2008; Morrisey, E., 2008.3 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: pp.37.4 Cp. Moore, S., 2008, March 20: p.1; Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,
2007: pp.27,42.5 Cp. Farrell, S., Oppel, R., 2008.6 Cp. Morrisey, E., 2008.
5Due to its unreliability and inability to detain internal and external threats it is
feared that in case of a premature U.S. withdrawal the Iraqi military will not be able to
stabilize the country. Experts assume that it will take years or even decades to
transform the military into a reliable and effectively operating force and to instill a
stable military culture in Iraq.7 Thus, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal raises serious
concerns whether the Iraqi armed forces will by then be independently able to
prevent a resumption of sectarian violence which would irresistibly lead to civil war. 8
Against this background the study is directed to provide a set of optional
measures which are both appropriate and feasible to further the military´s coherence
and strengthen its operational effectiveness. Thereby, it is intended to counteract the
current deadlocked exchange of sheer speculations about hypothetical scenarios and
to rather encourage a constructive discussion about how to transform the military into
a stabilizing factor within Iraq by tangible initiatives. In this way, the study aims to
contribute to a timely implementation of adequate initiatives which effectively
strengthen the armed forces and thus set a mandatory precondition for a responsible
U.S. withdrawal.
II) Means
The study will address the underlying causes of the military´s unreliability and
operational ineffectiveness in the first place and give a review of its most decisive
problems. In this respect the study will first focus on general military issues that to a
greater or lesser extent relate to all military units and will then turn to specific military
deficits which predominantly compromise the effectiveness of a particular military
branch. Subsequently, the study will identify military integration problems. This
complex will cover the lack of coherence within the Iraqi military and the challenge to
integrate members of the Awakening Movement9.
After the outline of major military problems the study will provide a compilation
of optional countermeasures and disclose possible ways for their implementation. At
first recommendations will focus on fundamental initiatives for a comprehensive
military reform which are particularly based on the theoretical concept of confidence-
building defense.10 According to the principles of the confidence-building defense
7 Cp. Morrisey, E., 2008; Robertson, C., 2008, August 6.8 Cp. DeYoung, K, Raghavan, S., 2008, August 21; Robertson, C., 2008, August 6.
9 Awakening Movements, or Sahwa: coalitions between tribal Sheikhs established to maintain security
and originally initiated among Sunni tribes.10 Cp. Kröning, V., Unterseher, L., & Verheugen, G. (eds.), 1998: pp.11-13.
6theory, the Iraqi military should be transformed via a particular specialization on
defense into a capable and cost-effective force which is least provocative to other
nation states. Correspondingly, recommendations will focus on measures to
reorganize, restructure, and equip the military in a way that maximizes its capacity to
operate flexibly and effectively within its territory and simultaneously minimizes its
capability to invade neighbor states. In this way, national stability and regional
reconciliation shall be enhanced at the same time.
Subsequently, the study will present a variety of integration methods based on
several respective case and research studies as well as proposals of various military
analysts and working groups. Given recommendations for an enhancement of the
military´s coherence imply a set of feasible measures to strengthen mutual
cooperation and to reduce sectarianism and politicization of military units.
Suggestions for the integration of the awakening fighters focus on regional
pacification and imply integration strategies and preventive security initiatives.
B) Deficits of the Iraqi military
II) Military problems
1) General military problems
a) Integrated military concept
Overall, the Iraqi military lacks an integrated concept aligned with both its
entire scope of responsibilities and to a mandatory code of conduct to respect the
sovereignty of other nation states. Without such concept the Iraqi military will not
meet the minimum requirement to affectuate stability all over the country and to be
least provocative to its neighbors.
The absence of an integrated concept is caused by an insufficient
determination of the Iraqi military´s security objectives and guidances towards
national reconciliation and regional pacification which is essential to conceptualize a
basic plan in order to be able to synchronize the military with its primary objectives.
Accordingly, the Iraqi military focused on conducting offensive counterinsurgency or
counterterrorism operations, whereas the execution of preventive defense missions,
such as nationwide control and protection responsibilities to neutralize internal and
7external threats, has been neglected. This unilateral offensive approach has led to a
vicious circle - military forces get extremely scuffed in single offensive missions, while
the lack of timely conflict prevention in turn heightens the necessity for further
offensive interventions. As a consequence, the attrition of forces steadily spirals,
while the country still cannot be stabilized area-wide.
Additionally, since the military has not been sufficiently directed to preventive
defense, the gap of citizens and infrastructure protection has been partially filled by
members of the Awakening Movement which has led to an additional internal security
risk due to the fact that awakening fighters do not operate under the command of the
MOD and are thus uncontrollable by the Iraqi government.
Besides, due to the lack of an integrated concept the military has not clearly
defined its objectives and guidances concerning armament procurement.
Consequentially, armament has been purchased without a corresponding strategic
plan and irrespective of a military code of conduct to be least provocative to other
nation states. According to this, the MOD has not revealed whether armament
procurement will be subject to any limitations, and specific types of armament
maximizing a military´s assault capacity, such as tactical missiles with ranges
exceeding 100 kilometers or armored attack helicopters, have not been restricted.
This deficiency raises concerns to which extent the Iraqi military will give regional
power projection and deterrence a priority in the long run. The more so as Iraq has
already become one of the biggest weapons buyers in the world, steadily purchasing
more heavy armament. In addition Iraqi procurement requests do not usually meet
much resistance by the U.S. due to the fact that their purchases reduce the reliance
on American military resources, and arms deals have been highly profitable for
American arms manufacturers.11 Even if the Iraqi military power is still assessed to
be low in comparison to other Gulf States this intransparency of military security
objectives, guidances, and armament already causes mistrust which could on a
political level easily not only keep others from reconciliation or collaboration but even
be perceived as a serious threat which has to be antagonized.
11 Cp. Cole, A., Dreazen, Y., 2008, September 5.
8b) Logistics and maintenance system
The Iraqi military has not yet devised a functioning logistics and maintenance
system.12 Therefore, combat units are prevalently short of weapons, vehicles,
ammunition, spare parts, and other basic supplies albeit copious stocks of war
material are stored in the Taji National Depot.
Due to these shortfalls the armed forces cannot revert to any backups for
inoperable vehicles and high equipment attrition caused by inaccurate maintenance
even amplifies this deficiency. Consequently, in a majority of cases commanders can
only resort to confiscated equipment to make repairs and provide needed war
material for ongoing operations.13 As a result of these shortcomings, operational
effectiveness and readiness of armed forces are severely constricted and fighting
units remain highly dependent on Coalition support.
The underlying reasons for this logistics and maintenance problem mainly
stem from bureaucratic and personnel deficiencies. The bureaucracy of the MOD is
complex, overcentralized, and lacks effective processes. Consequently, Iraqi units
encounter fundamental difficulties when they try to obtain needed war material. In
order to acquire e.g. ammunition by means of the existing logistics system, it takes a
commander to dispatch an officer to the MOD in Bagdhad in person to issue a
requisition request which then might take months for clearance and execution.14
In addition, the Iraqi military lacks logistics and maintenance personnel at all
levels, and the few logistics officers they have at their disposal preponderantly lack
expertise and are unfamiliar with many of the new systems and platforms. Thus,
neither a logistics force structure plan nor an information technology system to
support the command and control logistics system could yet be effectively
implemented.15
12 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: pp.53-71.13 Cp. Ibid., p.70.14 Cp. Ibid.15 Cp. Ibid., pp.53.
9c) Equipment
Iraqi armed forces are under-equipped and particularly short of crew-served
and indirect fire weapons, ammunition, aircraft, medical capabilities, reliable
communication systems, and basic battlefield equipment.16
As aforementioned, part of the problem is due to the absence of a functioning
logistics system which causes shortcomings and impedes the timely replacement of
outdated, low-grade equipment.17 Accordingly, the program to replace AK-47s from
various former Soviet republics and China with M-16 or M-4 rifles could only be
executed partially.18
Another problem is caused by procurement difficulties. Administrative
procurement processes are afflicted with widespread corruption and inefficiency
which causes funding deficits and extensive procurement delays. Military officials
repeatedly complained that the Pentagon´s Foreign Military Sales program (FMS),
set up to navigate the purchase of weapons, would be too slow and unwieldy for Iraqi
wartime needs. According to this, in 2006  the Iraqi government deposited $2.6 billion
in an account for FMS procurements, but by September 2007, in the midst of an
extremely violent war period, less than $200 million worth of badly needed armament
had been delivered.19
Meanwhile, apart from recent attempts to expediate procurements,
responsible Iraqi officials arbitrarily acquire military equipment irrespective of the
FMS system and beyond essential national approval procedures. In September 2007,
e.g., defense minister Abd al-Qadir and the planning minister Ali Glahil Baban
secretly negotiated an $833 million arms deal with Serbia without the approval of the
Iraqi contracts approval committee and without notice of respective senior Iraqi
military leaders and American commanders.20 Such bypassing practices caused
intransparency which in turn has many times seduced Iraqi officials to siphon off
funds. In September 2005 anti-corruption investigators, who had examined 89
government contracts, signed from June 2004 through February 2005, discovered
16 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: pp.67;
Robertson, C., 2008, August 6.17 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: pp.39, 70.18 Cp. Moore, S., 2008, April 13.19 Cp. Ibid.20 Cp. Ibid.
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that during this period alone approximately over $1.3 billion allocated by the Defense
Ministry for military procurement had been embezzled by officials and suppliers.21
In addition, the Iraqi military has been inappropriately equipped due to a
deficient assessment of military needs. Initially, the majority of military equipment has
been more or less arbitrarily composed of Coalition donations. Consequently, the
Iraqi military now posesses a hodgepodge of war material including firearms from the
United States, China, the Balkans, Pakistan, and Russia, 150 types of land vehicles
and a United Nations panoply of aircraft.22 This salmagundi further aggravates supply
procurement and maintenance and challenges the operability of the overall scant
equipment. Yet, due to an insufficient awareness of the retroactive effects, attempts
to standardize weapons and vehicles have not been pursued consistently.
Further, the Iraqi military´s purchase priority has unilaterally been focused on
facilitating offensive counterinsurgency operations of ground forces.23 The military
has started to remedy this deficiency by e.g. reinforcing navy and air force combat
capabilities through advanced weaponry, but still neglects to procure basic
equipment for defensive surveillance missions. Due to that, essential equipment for
border, airspace, and maritime control has not yet been sufficiently provided.24
Accordingly, Iraq is currently seeking to buy 36 advanced F-16s albeit the fact that
these fighter jets are clearly not the best choice for combatting domestic militias,
while the Iraqi air force still lacks basic equipment such as a reliable communication
system and currently relies on a total of nine radios and about 150 cell phones.25
Moreover, equipment has been purchased which is entirely unexpedient for
military missions. Thus, tens of millions of dollars have been spent either on
nonmilitary equipment, such as crowd control gear-batons, stun guns, and plexiglass
shields usually designed for and used by police forces or incongruous military arms,
e.g., certain mortar systems for $76 million which by virtue of their imprecision are not
well suited to combat guerrillas, especially when fighting occurs in built-up areas.26
Coalition advisors have consistently tried to prevent such mispurchases and to raise
21 Cp. Howard, M., 2005, September 20.22 Cp. Moore, S., 2008, April 13.23 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007;
Zavis, A., 2008, September 7.24 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007.25 Cp. Cole, A., Dreazen, Y., 2008, September 5;
Zavis, A., 2008, September 7.26 Cp. Moore, S., 2008, April 13.
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the awareness of military needs, but Iraqi leaders felt patronized and refused to
accept their help accordingly.
d) Manpower
The Iraqi military lacks qualified manpower at all levels which hampers its
readiness and effectiveness.
At present, approximately 30 percent of all battalions do not possess
appropriate numbers of leaders.27 Thus, some troops act without sufficient guidance.
Accordingly, C. Robertson exemplified in a New York Times article in August 2008
that “areas of Diyala heavy with insurgent traffic sit unpatrolled because the
battalions are not told who is in charge of what”.28 In order to counteract this
deficiency the government reemployed 20,000 officers, who had been previously
banned, in the course of the de-Baathification.29 Additionally, NATO and Coalition
forces have made considerable efforts to ensure sufficient training capacities,
including the establishment of the National Defense University (NDU), run by the
NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and the provision of additional training and
educational activities in- and outside Iraq.30 However, due to the virtual shutdown of
many Iraqi colleges and universities and an ongoing emigration of many educated
Iraqis, developing future leaders still remains problematic.
Likewise, the Iraqi military lacks qualified soldiers, who meet acceptable and
generally applied standards of training. Most soldiers have just received basic
training and many of them, due to different training programs in place since 2003,
operate at different standards.31 In addition, insufficient qualification results from a
unilateral focus on conducting solely counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the
military lacks particularly personnel which is trained to effectively execute border,
airspace, and maritime control.
Another important factor limiting military manpower, beside training
deficiencies, is absenteeism. On average Iraqi units are only at 60-75% of their
manning strength and units deployed for combat operations outside their usual area
of operation have leave rates as high as 50 percent.32 Absenteeism is caused by
27 Cp. Moore, S., 2008, March 20: p.4.28 Robertson, C., 2008, August 6: p.3.29 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: p.63.30 Cp. Ibid., pp.63-65.31 Cp. Ibid., pp.65.32 Cp. Ibid., p.63.
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various reasons. Some soldiers are wounded or leave to bring their families their pay
in person, due to the absence of a functioning banking system. Others become
AWOL33 due to the lack of military discipline. Exemplarily, in April 2008 one Iraqi
company in Bagdhad arbitrarily abandoned its position and forced American and Iraqi
commanders to hastily organize reinforcements, and more than 1,000 recently
qualified soldiers deployed to Basra deserted rather than obey orders to fight against
Sadr´s Mahdi Army.34 Poor military discipline and disobedience predominantly result
from the lack of enforcement of an Iraqi code of military discipline and the lack of a
legal framework to protect and orient military´s human resources. Thus, soldiers
simply do not have to fear the consequences of desertion since there is no effective
military judicial system in place, and they are easily seduced to desert due to the fact
that compensations for long-term disabilities and support for families of fallen soldiers
are almost nonexistent. 35
2) Specific military problems
a) Army
Apart from those deficits covered in the previous chapter, one particular
problem of the Iraqi army concerns its most capable element - the Iraqi Special
Operations Forces.36 The ISOF are specialized in anti-guerrilla operations and
particularly well-trained to place high-value targets in custody in “nonpermissive”
environments. However, the fact that they report directly to the Prime Minister´s
office, bypassing the national chain of command, raises concern about the neutrality
of these units. Since the Prime Minister communicates orders directly to field
commanders, it is feared that he would arbitrarily instruct forces to pursue unilateral
Shi´a interests. This possibility arouses suspicion within the Iraqi population and
perpetuates sectarian tensions.
33 AWOL: Absent Without Official Leave34 Cp. Farrell, S., Oppel, R., 2008.35 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: p.67.36 Cp. Ibid. pp.53,55, 63.
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b) Coastal Protection
The Iraqi Navy´s responsibility is of vital strategic importance since it is in
charge of protecting key Iraqi infrastructure that enables the shipping of most of
Iraq´s oil.37 Yet, the poor relationship with the Iraqi coast guard hampers its
operational effectiveness. Since both security forces operate in close proximity and
have complementary missions, reciprocal collaboration and information exchange are
essential. Yet, the two organizations either avoid – or compete against – each other,
due to sectarian influences within the coast guard and the fact that both operate
under different chains of command.
c) Air Force
The air force is currently organized for counterinsurgency operations and flies
surveillance and combat missions over Bagdhad and key critical infrastructure.38 It
particularly faces the challenge to synchronize air capabilities with joint (special
operations and army) missions. However, due to coordination deficiencies and
insufficient personnel synchronization skills the Iraqi air force is presently not able to
provide adequate air support for ground forces.
d) Intelligence Organizations
In order to plan and execute operations effectively the Iraqi military remains
higly dependent on Coalition support of intelligence due to the fact that Iraqi
Intelligence Organizations do not serve their purpose to provide information
satisfactorily.39 Iraq possesses four known intelligence organizations, the Directorate
General of Intelligence and Security (DGIS), the National Information and
Investigation Agency (NIIA), the Iraqi National Intelligence System (INIS) and an
independent intelligence organization established by the Ministry of State for National
Security Affairs (MSNSA). All intelligence organizations need to work in close
collaboration to support the ISF, but due to organizational competitiveness and
mutual mistrust they neither share gained information among each other nor with the
Iraqi military sufficiently.
37 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: pp.78-84.38 Cp. Ibid., pp.72-74.39 Cp. Ibid., pp.52.
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II) Military integration problems
1) Cohesion and loyalty
The Iraqi military´s cohesion is compromised by subversive infiltration and
politicization and is thus consistently in danger to fractionize along ethnic and
religious lines.
This is basically due to an imprudent ethnic and religious composition of the military
in the first place. Initially, the U.S. together with the Iraqi government created a Shi´a
dominated New Iraqi Army which in this regard mirrored the negative pattern of the
former Sunni dominated military under Saddam Hussein and was thus criticized as a
tool for enforcing exclusive Shi´a dominance throughout the country.40 Sunni Arabs
made up less than 10 percent of the ISF which is just half of their share of the
country´s overall population, and most units lacked a balance of Sunnis, Shiite
Muslims, and Kurds.41
Due to this, Kurds and Sunnis felt disenfranchised and perceived the Iraqi
military as a hostile Shi´a occupation force. The fear of Shi´a oppression was so
intense that e.g. in Fallujah imams publicly called on the people to attack the Iraqi
army.42 Consequentially, many Sunnis sought the aid of insurgents or even joined the
insurgency as fighters.43
In order to combat the increased insurgency the Coalition along with the Iraqi
government decided to raise the number of troops by incorporating not only Sunnis
but also Shi´a and Kurdish militias (Badr Brigade and Kurdish Peshmerga) although
all militias independent of the Iraqi armed forces had been declared illegal under
CPA Order #91 (June 2004).44 This decision, however, had far-reaching
consequences.
On the one hand it encouraged the military´s infiltration by subversives who
tried to counteract military missions and conducted numerous assaults on Iraqi
soldiers.45 In October 2004 rebels, who according to investigators had inside
information from military infiltrators, ambushed and executed 50 unarmed Iraqi
cadets in civilian clothes on their way home, and in December, more than 20 people
were killed on a U.S. military base near Mosul by an infiltrated suicide bomber of the
40 Cp. Sharp, J., 2007, January 18.41 Cp. Ibid.; Bender, B., Stockman, F., 2006, April12.42 Cp. Malkasian, C., 2007.43 Cp. Ibid.44 Cp. Sharp, J., 2007, January 18.45 Cp. Institute for the Study of War, 2007, October 26.
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Ansar al-Sunnah Army46.47 During that time Iraqi officials estimated that about 5
percent of the Iraqi government´s troops were infiltrated insurgents or sympathizers
of the insurgency.48
On the other hand Kurdish and Shi´a militias did not become loyal to the
central government and remained independent units within the military which were
more loyal to local tribal leaders and used their legitimation to enforce narrow
parochial political agendas.49 The Los Angeles Times reported in 2007 e.g. that the
5th Division of the Iraqi army stationed in Diyala province and headed by a Badr
Brigade commander was abused to conduct an intimidation campaign against the
province´s Sunni population.50 Such instances led many Sunnis to believe that the
government incorporated Shi´a militias solely to systematically crack down on the
Sunni population which did not only paralyze further Coalition attemps to integrate
more Sunnis into the Iraqi army but also strengthened the sectarian strife overall.51
Due to the forseeability of such consequences various analysts criticized the decision
to integrate militias as irresponsibly and imprudently directed to short-term political
expediency instead to Iraq´s long-term national interests.
Thereupon, Coalition forces and the Iraqi government announced to intensify
their efforts to abandon subversives and to create an Iraqi military that reflects the
ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation.52 In fact in the
following reports indications agglomerated that the U.S. and the Iraqi military would
finally make strides to detect and cull subversive elements and to develop more
military divisions that are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion.53 In
September 2008, Tehran Times stated that according to U.S. officials the ethnic and
religious blend of Iraq´s security forces, consisting of 54% Shiite, 31% Sunnis, and
13% Kurds would finally roughly resemble that of the nation.54
46 The Ansar al-Sunnah or Group of the Protectors of Sunnah is a militant salafi group in Iraq that is
fighting the U.S.-led occupation and the Iraqi government. The group is based in northern and
central Iraq and includes both Kurdish and Sunni Arabs as well as foreign fighters.47 Cp. Hoffmeyer D., 2004, December 12, China Daily , 2004, October 25,
Ottermann, S., 2005, February 28.48 Cp. Ibid.49 Cp. Sharp, J., 2007, January 18.50 Cp. Moore, S., 2007, January 03.51 Cp. Sharp, J., 2007, January 18; Malkasian, C., 2007.52 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: p.30.
Institute for the Study of War, 2007, October 26, Sharp, J., 2007, January 18.53 Cp. Interview with General D. Petraeus in Rüb, M.,2008, January 3: p.4,
O´Hanlon, M., Pollack, K., 2007, July 30.54 Cp. Tehran Times 2008, September 17.
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However, for want of evidence and due to obvious opposing trends these
apparant integration improvements still remain questionable. Neither the U.S. nor the
Iraqi government have provided detailed information about the actual quantity and
internal composition of ethnically mixed divisions.55 Without such information analysts
cannot evaluate whether the majority of divisions are in fact in balance or assess the
proclivity of individual units to turn into partisan militias. This lack of transparency
arouses suspicion, the more so as U.S. military spokespersons in the past had
claimed to be unable to provide respective information and were thus repeatedly
accused to disguise apparent deficiencies.56
Further, reports suggesting an increased reliability of forces due to the
successful abandonment of subversives have to be handled with care. The
effectiveness of security procedures to detect infiltration is still assessed to be
inadequate due to a deficient intelligence apparatus and additionally impeded by the
incompleteness of files on individuals from Saddam Hussein´s regime.57 Thus,
subversives are still frequently not traceable until they galvanize into action.58
Consequentially, the persisting danger of subversive infiltration further on sows
distrust between Iraqi forces and a comprehensive concept to actively strengthen the
confidence and cohesion of military units has not been implemented so far. Thus,
improvements of internal security, coherence or loyalty of combat units cannot simply
be derived from a series of cases of detecting subversives.
Moreover, recent reports indicate that military units remain unchanged more
likely to place their loyalties with political factions rather than with the Iraqi
government.59 Accordingly, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered a major offensive
in Basra last spring to eradicate militia influence, but 75% of the enlisted soldiers and
80% of officers of the 14th Division opposed to battle in their native area and
deserted.60 Furthermore, journalists revealed in September 2008 that the Peshmerga
forces still remain independent within the Iraqi army and would even gear up for
combatting the Iraqi army due to a dispute between Kurdish leaders and the central
government in Bagdhad over the status of Khanaqin city. Such developments cast
55 Cp. Serchuk, V., 2006, March 9.56 Cp. Ibid.57 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007, Ottermann, S., 2005,
February 28.58 Cp. Sharp, J., 2007, January 18.59 Cp. Ibid.; Serchuk, V., 2006, March 9.60 Cp. Peter, T., 2008, September 15.
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doubt on announced integration improvements and illustrate that the Iraqi miltary´s
problem of cohesion and loyalty is still far from being solved. 61
2) Integration of Sahwa fighters
Since 2005 the so-called Awakening Movements, or Sahwa, – coalitions
between tribal Sheikhs established to maintain security and originally initiated among
Sunni tribes – have become a remarkable force that gained substantially in size and
influence. At present, the movement consists of estimated 100,000 members, mostly
Sunni, and many of them have so far been paid by the U.S. military to support anti-al-
Qaeda operations.62 According to some analysts awakening fighters have effectively
achieved to reduce violence in their operating areas and the U.S. military considers
them to be one of the most effective vigors against AQI and an indispensable military
backup.63 Due to their intensive engagement, awakening fighters thus demand to be
officially incorporated into the ISF.
To the Iraqi government, however, the Awakening Movements are a thorn in
its flesh, because they consider them as an armed Sunni opposition in the making.
Accordingly, since several of the awakening members were former commissioners of
the Saddam regime and active resistance fighters after the U.S.-Invasion, partially
confederated with AQI, the government fears subversive infiltration and remains
reluctant to integrate them.64 Due to political pressure and urged by the U.S., the
government finally agreed to incorporate about 20%65 of their strength into the ISF,
but didn´t comply with this covenant so far.66 On the contrary, in August 2008, the
government launched a campaign to disban the Sunni Awakening groups and issued
650 arrest warrants for high-ranking awakening members, whereupon Sunni tribal
leaders threatened to take up arms.67 Thus, analysts and policy makers fear that this
dispute could result in a resumption of sectarian violence or even escalate into civil
war.68 The more so as the U.S. currently seeks to gradually hand over control of
61 Cp. International Herald Tribune, 2008, April 12, Steele, J., 2008, September 3.62 Cp. Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10; Rubin, A., Cave, D., 2007, December 23;
Interview   with General D. Petraeus in Rüb, M.,2008, January 3: p.4.63 Cp. Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10;Musharbash, Y., 2008, August 22.64 Cp. Musharbash, Y., 2008, August 22.; Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10.65 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to integrate 20% of the awakening members, but a
government spokesman later on declared that this concession was based on the government´s
assumption that the Awakening groups would only consist of a total of 50,000 instead of 100,000
members. Cp. Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10.66 Cp. Brooks, B. 2007, December 24;  Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10.67 Cp. Musharbash, Y., 2008, August 22.68 Cp. Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10.
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Iraq´s provinces to the Iraqi government and consequentially of the awakening
members which will raise tensions, if further U.S. payments disrupt and at least
80,000 Sahwa fighters will be left unintegrated.69
C) Recommendations
I) Recommendations for an integrated military reform
1) Suggestions: General military problems
a) Development of an integrated military concept
The study recommends a military concept which bases on the theoretical
concept of confidence-building defense.70 Thereupon, the Iraqi military shall be
transformed into a capable cost-effective force by enhancing the defensive potential
of its armed forces while limiting its capacity for cross-border offensive action. In
contrast to the current offensive approach a specialization on defense offers a way to
stabilize the country area-wide without wearing down combat units. At the same time
a nonoffensive defense posture, adopted by incorporating limits on the capacity for
offensive action, improves crisis stability and mitigates interstates` tensions. In this
way an alternative approach to defense and arms control policy will strengthen the
effectivity of armed forces to detain external and internal threats and encourage
national and regional reconciliation.
According to the principles of confidence-building defense, aggression will be
principally deterred by lowering an aggressor´s propability of success, or in case
deterrence fails, it will contain and exhaust aggression by using a combination of
area-defense and smaller-scale maneuver forces and tactics.71 In adjustment to this
a military concept should comprise the following efforts to enhance the defensive
potential of regional armed forces.
The structure and deployment of forces should be adapted to the “spider-in-its-
web” model72 in order to reach a higher troop dispersion for rapid military reaction
and combat forces relief. Accordingly, forces should be restructured into an area-
covering component of ground forces with low organic mobility and a mechanized/air-
mechanized component in a three or four-to-one ratio. The fist component
69 Cp. Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10.70 Cp. Unterseher, L., 2007: pp.75-83.71 Cp. Conetta, C., Knight, C. & Unterseher, L., 1991: p.2.72 Cp. Ibid.; Unterseher, L., 2007: pp.118-122.
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establishes a quasi-stationary net covering the country area-wide with crosspoints at
critical urban spots and key infrastructure. Crosspoints should be manned by light
infantry units. The area-covering component executes protective and control
operations and serves as an early warning system for the mechanized/air-
mechanized components to timely trace early signs of possible violent outbreaks, and
in the event of war it provides intelligence, logistics, and combat support for forces of
the second component. Thereby, in order to improve the intelligence gathering
capacity of the first component it is necessary to place increased emphasis on the
use of sensor fields, reconnaissance drones (e.g. of American, German, and Israeli
origin), and network communications while putting less focus on intelligent weapons.
Moreover, for the eventuality of aggression by a neighbor, the area-covering
component should be in charge to prepare likely battlefields for the second
component thoroughly by establishing e.g. anti-tank obstacles, trenches, shelters,
minefields, and underground headquartered, mutually supporting, fortified
strongpoints incorporating tanks in hull-down position and alternate protected firing
positions for artillery.73
In contrast, the mechanized component functions as a rapid deployment force
to avoid the escalation of violent outbreaks by showing the flag or, if necessary, by
combatting violent upheavals in an early stage.74 By operating in close interaction
with the area-covering component the mechanized component should narrow the
scope of armed clashes by selectively defending critical areas. Therefore, the
mechanized component has to be featured with a high degree of flexibility to be able
to move, like a spider in its web, quickly from one crosspoint of the quasi-stationary
net to the other. The operational mobility for the speedy allocation of those troops
derives from the decoupling of defensive from offensive mobility: marching rapidly to
thicken up the net wherever needed (“hasten to defend”), but not being able to attach
under heavy fire. This has structural and technological implications. Typically, the
second component would comprise light mechanized infantry and calvalry formations
on wheeled armored carriers and being equipped with monitoring and counter-
mobility gear.75 Further, the mobility of troops should be partially substituted for
placing increased emphasis on indirect fire (e.g. artillery systems). In accordance
with a nonoffensive defense posture, the range of artillery systems should be limited
73 Cp. Conetta, C., Knight, C. & Unterseher, L., 1991.74 Cp. Ibid.75 Cp. Ibid.
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to 50 kilometers and the range of close air support aircraft to 300 kilometers combat
radius. Likewise, Iraqi air force modernization plans should eschew expensive longer-
range multi-purpose aircraft and emphasize shorter-range air superiority fighter and
close-air support aircraft instead.
Furthermore, special provisions for border security should be made for the
event of an invasion. Thereby, it is advisable to make better use of defensive depth
to trade space for time and enemy casualties which outwears and demoralizes
invaders while disburdening Iraqi troops. Military analysts Carl Conetta, Charles
Knight and Lutz Unterseher developed an adjustable border-protection model which
comprises three types of defense zones: a border zone, a borderzone/stronghold
interface, and a stronghold area.76
The border zone would be patrolled by light cavalry units with the mission to
detect and evaluate incursions and in the event of an invasion delay invading forces
by attacking its forward reconnaissance elements. According to field preparations,
the border zone should be vested with an array of sensors, anti-tank obstacles, and
minefields.
Attached to the border zone a borderzone/stronghold interface would function
to further diminish an aggressor´s strength. In this area invaders´ mobility could be
impeded by mines deployed by helicopters, covered by airmobile anti-tank units and
ground-attack aircraft.
Behind the borderzone/stronghold interface follows a stronghold area which
comprises tank obstacles and minefields, covered by anti-tank infantry fighting from
prepared positions, mobile tube- and rocket-artillery systems, and mobile air-defense
units. In order to permit adjacent strongholds to support each other and deliver
overlapping fires on the areas between them, stronghold artillery and air-defense
weapons could extend 30-50 kilometers beyond the stronghold´s boundaries. In this
way armored and airmobile forces could operate under the cover of the artillery and
air defense systems which themselves find protection within the stronghold area.
The adoption of the “3-zone-border” concept as well as the “spider-in-its-web”
model and the consistent limitation of offensive capacities will contribute to greater
stability within Iraq in two different aspects: by using depth and dispersal to reduce
incentives for aggression and by minimizing the provocation of neighbor states to
76 Cp. Conetta, C., Knight, C. & Unterseher, L., 1991. pp. 9.
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undertake preemtive strikes. However, in case aggression cannot be avoided, the “3-
zone-border” concept offers a way to efficiently contain and exhaust invading forces,
whereas the “spider-in-its-web” model provides the potential to reduce the scope of
encounters and effectively combat guerillas. Therefore, the implementation of both
concepts would not only advantageously effect Iraq´s current security situation,
affected by regional tensions and local smaller-scale violence, but also provide
adequate protection against possible large-scale external aggression.
Furthermore, the stabilizing effect of both concepts, along with the fact that
defense is a more economical way of fighting, could reasonably be used to reduce
the military´s manning strength. Thereby, reductions can be made by concentrating
on trained recruits and qualified leadership in exchange for overaged less qualified
personnel and by focusing on support units, to strengthen the effectivity of troops by
providing adequate logistics and medical support, while cutting the number of combat
forces. Thereby, in order to avoid tensions, released personnel should be adequately
compensated and/or integrated into established job-programs. This reduction of
combat forces would not only save military expenses, but also add authority to the
military´s nonoffensive defense posture.
In addition to the structural specialization on defense, it is further
recommendable to reveal the country´s nonoffensive defense posture to other
neighbor states in order to encourage national reconciliation. For this purpose Iraq
could undertake a variety of confidence-building initiatives.77 The Iraqi government
could e.g elucidate the principles of the Iraqi military concept, its security objectives
and guidances and give limited permission to neighbor states for monitoring and
inspections of e.g. basic framework, procurement plans etc.78 Further, Iraq could
officially pledge itself to refrain from destabilizing offensive-weapons arms races and
pursue serious arms control efforts.79 Moreover, the country could publicly commit
itself to announce military maneuvers and make arrangements with neighboring
states for the exchange of observers. In this way by granting an adequate level of
transparency the country could demonstrate to respect the sovereignty of other
states and hence minimize the risk of external threats.
However, to furnish prima facie evidence of an Iraqi nonoffensive defense
posture the presence of U.S. forces could expectedly emerge as a paralyzing factor.
77 Cp. Unterseher, L., 2007: pp.82.78 As a matter of course this cannot include sensitive data e.g. about specific weapons positions.79 For specific arms control initiatives see Conetta, C., Knight, C. & Unterseher, L., 1991. pp.14.
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The specialization on defense and the limitation of offensive capacities might not be
taken seriously by Iraq´s neighbors as long as the country is still covered, guided,
and equipped by a military superpower. Furthermore, the poor relationship between
the U.S. and Syria as well as Iran and instances such as the U.S. recent disrespect
of the Syrian border could make an Iraqi military nonoffensive defense posture
untrustworthy. Due to that, U.S. presence should end as soon as possible. Yet, since
the Iraqi armed forces will need time to implement the suggested changes and to
credibly specialize on defense, the military might during its transition period rely on a
third party´s assistance. In order to overcome this quandary it is thus advisable to pull
U.S. forces out and to rather deploy an independent external force instead.
As a suggestion, a transition force of 30,000 soldiers authorized by the UN
Security Council should be allocated to the country´s hot spots with the mission to
monitor U.S. withdrawal and to bolster the Iraqi military over a fixed period. Thereby,
in order to have a truly stabilizing confidence-building effect, the external force should
not only be tactically and technically efficient, but also be able to work in close
interaction with the Iraqi population. Therefore, it would be advantageous to recruit
soldiers from moderate Islamic countries such as Morocco, Egypt or Jordan to avoid
language or integrational discrepancies. In this way by timely deploying preventive
forces U.S. withdrawal as well as the Iraqi military could be safeguarded while the
Iraqi military could be disburdened to use an additional time-frame to transform and
develop its capacities. In 1995, such a UN preventive force was established under
General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali, as a consequence of the Rwandan
Genocide which might have been averted by a single mechanized brigade.80 The
insertion of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia successfully exemplified that preventive
deployment can be an effective form of peacekeeping, if it is done at the right time
and with a clear mandate.81 Accordingly, instead of having troops on the ground the
U.S. could play a far more supportive role by advocating the establishment of a UN
80 Cp. Unterseher, L., 2004.
81 Within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the UN Security Council decided, by adopting
resolution 983(1995), that UNPROFOR would be known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment
Force (UNPREDEP) with mandate, responsibilities and composition identical to those in place. The
UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (also referred to under its acronym
FYROM) is the first mission in the history of the United Nations peacekeeping to have a preventive
mandate. Cp. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (1999).
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preventive peacekeeping force in the UN Security Council and could further help to
finance it e.g. by paying back American debts to the UN. 82
b) Establishment of a functioning logistics and maintenance system
In order to become truly independent the Iraqi military needs to devise
autonomous mechanisms of its own to optimize its logistics and maintenance system.
Due to the assistance and support provided by the Multi-National Security Transition
Command the Iraqi military has already taken first measures to establish a basis for a
self-sufficient logistics apparatus by instituting basic systems and processes and
reerecting/extending infrastructure.
Yet, as a given result of omnipresent deficiencies Iraqi leaders reject to simply
entirely adopt U.S. suggested concepts which by virtue of their overreliance on
outsourcing logistics are regarded to be completely incongruous with the Iraqi notion
of a self-contained logistics system. Consequentially, instead of imposing the
implementation of U.S. solutions upon the Iraqi military it is rather advisable to
support the Iraqis in developing their own measures which embrace their particular
needs, conceptions, and conventions. With respect to the long-term objective to
establish a self-dependent Iraqi military the U.S. will now have to gradually curtail its
engagement and confine itself to giving general advice and providing logistics
expertise only.
Hence, the U.S. should initially focus on gradually replacing its current
advisers and consultants with adequate indigenous advisers and analysts. In the long
run an exclusively Iraqi logistics adviser team should be established accordingly. The
replacement of all U.S. advisers will in turn require the employment of approximately
5,000 experts which as a matter of fact will be in the short- and midterm a difficult
endeavor with regard to the current lack of qualified and experienced personnel
within Iraq. In this respect it might be necessary and expedient to recruit additional
logistics advisers from other moderate Islamic countries such as Kuwait, Jordan or
Morocco for a certain interim period. Thus, the manning level requirements could be
met and both language and integrational problems as well as general resentments
against U.S. military consultants could be averted at the same time. These external
advisers could be hired on a contract basis and later reduced and replaced by Iraqi
82 Cp. Unterseher, L., 2004.
24
personnel as soon as the Iraqi logistics system has matured and a sufficient number
of Iraqi logistics experts has been trained.
The logistics adviser team should basically be sectioned into three
departments. The first department will assist the distinct military branches and work
closely with Iraqi ground, air and maritime forces. Experts of this department would
especially have to sensitize commanders to make preventive maintenance a priority
and to timely request sufficient equipment, spares, and backups from the MOD.
The second department will be both responsible for operational procedures
within logistics facilities such as warehouses or storages and for the organization of
speedy and safe distribution of supplies including their passage in transit. Central
issues of this task force will be finding measures to accelerate working processes
and optimizing the protection of logistics facilities and routes of transport, e.g. by
conceptualizing self-protection plans for single facilities and by minimizing the
vulnerability of major supply lines. Additionally, the second department should also
be tasked to assist in putting up a more decentralized supply system while limiting
the importance of the Taji National Depot by raising a various number of other depots
each being closely connected to respective key military facilities.
The third department will be working closely with the MOD to improve the
provision of administrative logistics capabilities and to synchronize the first and
second division with the key decision-makers. Advisers of the third department will
assist the MOD in finding ways to accelerate administrative processes by simplifying
or even decentralizing essential approval procedures. They will further the
improvement of governmental and administrative support and their interaction with
the military by making administrative processes more flexible. This will put the MOD
and the military in a position in which they will be able to cope with alterations to the
normal chain of supply in case of disruptions caused by enemy interference.
Additionally, it is highly important that consultants induce a sense of foresight for
timely planning of supply procurement and distribution in order to prevent requisition
delays from automatically resulting in considerable logistics shortfalls. Likewise,
advisers will also have to improve the collaboration between the different
compartments of the MOD to facilitate maximum coordination of effort.
In order to ensure proper consultation of all advising units it is recommendable
to subordinate the logistics adviser team to a seperate governmental logistics
analyst´s commission which coordinates and supervises advising units and in turn
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reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. In this way both the logistics adviser
team and the seperate analyst´s commission will be adequately monitored and
supervised. Personnel for the logistics analyst´s commission will be required to
possess extensive logistics expertise and experience in logistics force structure
analysis in order to be able to evaluate progress in development and detect emerging
deficiencies.
In addition to the establishment of such expert teams, the Iraqi military will
further need to train large numbers of qualified personnel in order to effectively
implement the information technology system and the MOD´s logistics force structure
plan. Since Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to outsource logistics services it is
advisable for the Iraqi government to place further emphasis on the education of
logistics personnel and the expansion of training capacities in cooperation with the
U.S. and NATO.83 Apart from further expansion of internal capacities the Iraqi military
could also resort to a considerable number of soldiers from combat units who will be
dispensable after the targeted military reform. These respective soldiers could be
both send to receive external training in neighboring countries such as Kuwait or
Jordan and be reeducated by Iraqi capacities.
The provision of adequately qualified personnel, the development of Iraqi
logistics adviser teams and an Iraqi analyst´s commission would be important steps
for the Iraqi military to detach from U.S. patronage. Improved logistics support will
automatically enhance the operational effectiveness of the Iraqi military and due to
an innate advising apparatus the Iraqi military would further be able to solve its
logistics and maintenance problems self-dependently and in accordance with an Iraqi
agenda.
83 For detailed information about possible initiatives see: recommendations for enhancing manpower
capabilities and capacities (pp.28).
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c) Improving the provision of military equipment
In regard to the military´s equipment problems, measures have to be found to
ensure a timely provision of sufficient supplies. As aforementioned, shortfalls caused
by a deficient logistics and maintenance system or by an ineffective bureaucracy
have both to be remedied by extensive engagement of Iraqi logistics advisers and
analysts.84
In addition, it is necessary to intensify endeavors against widespread
corruption to warrant that funds for needed war material will not be diverted from
intended use. Since corruption in Iraq has reached an enormous extent and
recriminations from Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials have dramatically saped each
others confidence, it would be reasonable to seek the aid of an independent third
party. Accordingly, the Iraqi government could request assistance of the United
Nations which has developed specialized anti-corruption sub-organizations such as
the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the Centre
for International Crime Prevention. These organizations have been specifically
installed for assisting developing countries to combat corruption and dispose of up-to-
date information and extensive expertise on effective policy strategies to reduce and
control this kind of crime.85 In this regard the United Nations could delegate a task
force of anti-corruption experts to Iraq which together with the Iraqi government and
respective key authorities of the MOD elaborate on a set of activities to prevent,
detect, and fight corruption.
Accordingly, UN experts could at first assess existing national measures
against corruption such as relevant legislation, institutions, and adminstrative
regulations and, upon request, assist in the revision of ineffective legislation and/or in
the adoption of specific provisions, including specific anti-corruption legislation.86
Subsequently, they could provide advise and technical support to establish and/or
strengthen effective anti-corruption bodies such as an independent anti-corruption
commission or an anti-corruption investigative unit and help to create internal
structures and procedures within the MOD for inspecting and controlling.
Furthermore, the task force could promote the prevention of corruption by various
initiatives such as assisting the Iraqi government to raise anti-corruption awareness,
drafting a code of conduct and ethics, setting up a system of disciplinary sanctions,
84 S. pp.22-24.85 Cp. Global Programme against Corruption, 1999.86 Cp. Ibid.
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and providing training on newly introduced anti-corruption measures. Indeed, such a
concerted effort with UN experts could not only offer the possibility to effectively
combat corruption and the misuse of military funding but also enable Iraqi leaders to
implement their own conceptions while mitigating respective U.S.-Iraqi tensions.
Alongside anti-corruption initiatives, measures should be taken to ensure that
the Iraqi military gets appropriately equipped. Therefore, it is necessary that the MOD
along with the U.S. and a group of external military analysts place reniewed attention
on specific Iraqi military needs and jointly revise modernization and standardization
plans.
Regarding the revision of procurement plans, the Iraqi military should refrain
from facilitating unilateral offensive counterinsurgeny operations and focus on
defensive missions such as border, airspace, and coastal protection as well as on
network-based control of domestic territory plus basic military supplies (e.g. engineer
equipment, transport, medical care). Moreover, general standardization plans have to
be elaborated and executed consistently. Finally, outdated equipment should be
registered and disposed of while unexpedient equipment should, if possible, be
transferred to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the National Police (NP) or the
Department of Border Enforcement (DBE).
Recommendations (priorities of procurement):
In accordance with the recommended military reform there should be procurement
priorities as follows:
In the context of the ground forces planning would have to concentrate on:
- the protective, all-encompassing net which needs simple, robust and effective
communications equipment along with reinforced sheltering facilities for the
crosspoints,
- and on a standard family of light armored vehicles (4x4, up to 10t) for both:
mechanized infantry and cavalry – the former stronger in dismounted
personnel and the latter with more firepower (ATGMs with bunker-breaking
capability, machine cannon, automatic grenade launchers).
- The same familiy of vehicles would also serve as basis of reconnaissance
formations – to be urgently equipped with tactical drones (UAVs) and
battlefield radar.
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- As a backup for the lightly structured (local) infantry in the net and for
intervening mechanized elements, there should be a component of mobile,
protected artillery (preferably the French CAESAR or the Slovak ZUZANA) to
provide – alternating between strongholds – flexible and accurate indirect fire.
In a first phase 3 battalions would suffice.
- Combat engineers should concentrate on countermobility rather than on
mobility-enhancing gear.
- The logistics system needs modern infrastructure for a decentralized depot
organization: to be integrated with the net. From these regionally distributed
bases a standard family of trucks would “feed” the troops within reasonable
reach (1/3 of the trucks with armored cabins and mine protection).
With respect to the air force urgent requirements are:
- Above all, base infrastructure and service-wide communication need the
planners´ attention and substantial investment.
- To achieve at relatively low cost an all-weather, around-the-clock surveillance
of national territory, and especially of border areas and coastal waters, drones
(UAVs) of operational range / endurance should be procured.
- Easy to handle prop-jet aircraft for advanced training and COINmissions
(Swiss PILATUS, Brasilean TUCANO) should form the backbone of the
manned flying component: 3-6 squadrons in the beginning.
- Light jet fighter bombers (1-2 squadrons).
- The plan to purchase 36 F-16 fighter bombers in the U.S. should be
reconsidered: particularly as it appears in the context of arming against Iran.
18-24 fighters for armed surveillance, to protect the integrity of national
airspace, should be enough. If multi-role aircraft are to be procured, they
should be equipped in such a manner (no air-to-surface weapons) that their
defensive dedication is unambiguously clear. Given its greater potential for
upgrades the Swedish JAS-39 seems to be a better choice than the F-16.
With respect to requirements for coastal protection:
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- A combination of armed patrol boats (machine cannon, anti-ship missiles), e.g.
from German production, and a few platforms for mine-countermeasures has
to be considered.
d) Enhancing manpower capabilities and capacities
In order to come across the current lack of qualified personnel the Iraqi military
needs to place special emphasis on the education of an increased number of
commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as on qualified logistics and
medical personnel. Besides, the military should prescind from its current unilateral
training focus on combat operations and intensify its endeavors to train soldiers
thoroughly in conducting control and protection missions instead.
Therefore, the Iraqi government along with NTECG should direct its attention
to expanding educational capacities in- and outside Iraq and to instituting additional
training programs. Accordingly, the teaching staff of the NDU consisting of the Joint
Staff College (JSC), the Iraqi Military Academy of Ar Rustimayah (IMAR), and the
National Defense College (NDC) should be augmented considerably. In this way
additional capacities could be provided to raise the recruitment ratio of Iraqi military
leadership personnel essentially and to offer an ample variety of pivotal training
courses. This would not only allow to provide intensified training in defensive
missions but also to submit refresher courses to remedy the current deficiency of well
and evenly educated personnel.
In addition, further facilities for professional logistics and medical education
have to be established. Yet, until completion measures have to be taken to provide
respective education in foreign countries. In order to allow an increasing number of
Iraqi personnel to be trained abroad, e.g. in foreign NATO schools and training
centres, either the capacity of the Iraqi military´s language institute has to be
enhanced or soldiers have to be given access to language schools outside Iraq.
Such an expansion of capacities will go along with the need of an increased
number of trainers and apprentices. Those could be recruited specifically from the
pool of redundant combat forces that will remain after the aspired military reform.
Furthermore, it could also be considered to revert to capacities in the Iraqi Awakening
groups and endorse their enlistment which could even be auxiliary to mitigate current
Sunni-Shi´a tensions.
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Besides, the development of new educational facilities and the submission of
more training programs will require long-term engagement and considerable financial
resources. In this respect it might be inevitable to extend NTM-I to at least 2012, and
to encourage NATO members to rather support educational programs instead of
making equipment donations that counteract Iraqi standardization plans.
Beyond the improvement of military education, measures have to be taken to
raise the effectiveness of active troops by enhancing military discipline and
motivation. Enforcing military discipline will require a well elaborated military legal
and judicial system and the sustainable implementation of an integral military code of
conduct in the first place. As this law-related project demands great skill and
experience in legislation, it is advisable to establish a special independent
commission of expert legal advisers assigned to reassess and revise existing
statutory provisions and redraft relevant legislation with regard to fundamental Iraqi
conventions.
Due to a rather restricted timeframe for new development of a sustainable
military legal framework it would be quite reasonable to seek to transfer respective
legal conceptions from foreign countries which have stood the test of time.
Comparable processes of transference of legal doctrines from one legal system to
another have been performed by several countries in the past, e.g. Japan largely
adopted the European (primarily German) civil law system and the Greek civil code of
1946 is highly influenced by the German civil code of 1896. Correspondingly,
Lebanon´s civil law is designed after the French model and Turkey´s civil law has
been built after the Swiss “Zivilgesetzbuch” of 1907.
Against this background it could be considered to basically adopt the German
military disciplinary code (German: Wehrdisziplinarordnung, WDO87), for instance,
which has proved itself to be well-balanced and effective and has shaped the
German military´s reputation of stern discipline. On the one hand the German military
disciplinary code comprises an ample variety of sophisticated disciplinary measures
which are individually graduated according to the specific types of breach of duty
reaching from reprimands, curfews, forfeits, degradation, and imprisonment while
avoiding any kind or notion of corporal punishment which in turn is a daily occurrence
in Iraq. On the other hand it provides a distinct rewarding system for extraordinary
military performance which functions as an effective motivation tool. The
87 Cp. Gesetze im Internet (2002). URL: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/wdo_2002/gesamt.pdf.
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implementation of such a well-balanced system of reward and retribution by means of
a disciplinary code will in turn act as a self-regulating factor.
Apart from instituting self-regulating mechanisms it is also recommendable to
establish a self-contained military jurisdiction for effective law enforcement purposes.
Both the adoption of the German military disciplinary code and the establishment of
military courts could substantially improve military obedience and reduce desertion
while enhancing soldiers’ motivation by awarding particular combat performances.
Besides, desertion could also be reduced by giving incentives to military
personnel in the shape of enhanced state support. This may include a wide range of
measures such as providing better medical care for military personnel and their
families particularly emphasising e.g. the coverage of counseling and traumata
treatment, granting adequate compensation of soldiers with long-term disablilties,
and supporting surviving dependants of fallen soldiers.
2) Suggestions: Specific military problems
a) Army
In order to enforce the neutrality of all military forces national command lines
must flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of the Iraqi
armed forces. Accordingly, steps have to be taken to ensure that command and
control of the Iraqi Special Operation Forces are executed through the national chain
of command. Therefore, the Iraqi Prime Minister should refrain from respective
bypassing practices and abolish or transform institutions which are geared to
circumvent national command lines such as the Counter-Terrorism Bureau and the
Office of the Commander in Chief.88 (Conceptionally, the ISOF should be regarded
as – additional – spider elements in the net).
b) Coastal Protection
Improving maritime control requires to either merge navy and coast guard into
one single organization for coastal maritime security or to strengthen the cooperation
between those organizations considerably.89 Establishing a single organization would
enable navy and coast guard to operate both under the command of the MOD which
88 Cp. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007: pp. 53.89 Cp. Ibid., pp. 83-85.
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would be conducive to achieve an effective distribution of work and to encourage
mutual cooperation. Otherwise it would be recommendable to establish platforms for
information exchange and arrange joint training courses in order to ensure mutual
collaboration. Assistance to the organizational merger as well as to the development
of joint courses and platforms could thereby both be provided by the Maritime
Services Transition Team, which should gradually be replaced by advisers from
moderate Islamic countries.
c) Air Force
Enhancing air and ground synchronization requires concerted efforts of ground
operators, planners, and airpower experts to develop streamlined practices and
further the interoperability of different formations. In order to improve the
synchronization of Coalition forces, for instance, Coalition members quarterly
organize expert conferences to address air and ground synchronization issues.90 In
accordance with this, Coalition members could utilize their gained knowledge or
available expertise and establish a network of ground operators, planners, and
airpower experts to assist the Iraqi military and develop in collaboration with NTECG
special synchronization training courses.
d) Intelligence Organizations
By establishing competing intelligence organizations Iraq obstructed the
passage to develop an effectively working intelligence apparatus. The structural
division of agencies obliged to maintain secrecy inevitably conflicts with the need for
information exchange, generates unnecessary duplication of effort, and due furthers
the waste of resources. The intelligence transition team´s current attempt to solely
mediate between those organizations will supposedly only marginally enhance
collaboration and coordination.
In contrast to this approach, it is recommendable to centralize the Iraqi
intelligence system and merge all intelligence agencies into one single organization
divided into two departments - one for internal and the other one for external affairs.
The advantage of a centralized intelligence system is to be able to pool related areas
of operations, such as analysis and evaluation of information, HUMINT or SIGINT.
90 Cp. Kurtz, P., 2008, March 17.
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This will not only accelerate information processing and alleviate cooperation and
coordination but also facilitate the efficient use of resources.
In order to provide professional assistance to the merger of Iraq´s intelligence
organizations it would thereby be beneficial to create a new intelligence transition
team. Due to the fact that the U.S. possess an intelligence system that is even more
decentralized than the present Iraqi apparatus and which is in contrast to Iraq´s
requirements preponderantly geared towards SIGINT, American advisers might not
be suitable for establishing a centralized system with a balanced relation of HUMINT
and SIGINT. Since other Intelligence Systems such as the Dutch, British and German
Intelligence System are both centralized and in regard to the acquisition of
information well-balanced, it could thus be reasonable to set up a respective
european advisory team.
II) Recommendations for military integration
1) Enhancing cohesion and loyalty
Reducing subversive tendencies will require to construct the military in a way
that finds more acceptance within the Iraqi population. Therefore, the military´s
constitution has to be aligned with the democratic principle of equal rights.
Accordingly, the military´s ethnic and religious composition has to correspond
with the proportional share of Sunni, Shia, and Kurds within Iraq to ensure that all
major sections of the population equally participate in the exertion of military power.
Likewise, to prevent the dominance of partisan interests, all military divisions have to
possess a high degree of heterogeneity and military leadership should rotate
irrespective of ethnic or religious boundaries at regular intervals, suggestively every
3-4 years. In this way the Iraqi military would clearly reveal to avouch the
representation of superior national interests which could considerably reduce stimuli
for hostile infiltration.
In addition, loyalty and cohesion within the military could further be
strengthened by reinforcing democratization through advocating equal rights and
treatment of all military employees. Accordingly, the military should elaborate on a
universal code of conduct and ethics to demonstrate its policy of equality and soldiers
should receive lectures in ethics to encourage a sense of democratic awareness and
tolerance. Besides, the military should underline its policy of equal treatment by
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developing standardized hiring and career advancement procedures to ensure that
respective decisions are solely based on performance and not on ethnic or religious
sympathies.
Furthermore, the military has to set up a legal framework to protect each
employee´s rights and duties along with national interests. Correspondingly, legal
regulations and institutions have to be established which effectively proceed against
disregard and mortification of personal rights as well as against subversive activities.
Suggestively, the Iraqi military should install a code enforcement complaints
procedure which enables each soldier who falls victim to rights violation or witnesses
subversive actions to file a complaint against comrades and superiors.91 Thereby, in
order to encourage soldiers to report malfeasances, the immunity of each
complainant has to be guaranteed to protect witnesses and victims from retaliation.
Further, an investigative unit should be established which is tasked to
thoroughly check up on applicants and to investigate in cases of misconduct to
effectively reduce subversive elements and detect deviant behavior. In case of
evidenced misconduct the degree of penalty has to be determined in accord with an
elaborated disciplinary code and possibly decided by special military courts. In order
to ensure the effectiveness of the investigative unit it is further recommendable to
additionally establish an independent supervisory committee subordinated to the Iraqi
parliament which monitors investigators´ activities and defines policies and strategies
for dealing with misconduct. An effective criminal prosecution is an essential
prequisite to reduce cases of malfeasance, and it provides confidence in the military
which is decisive to create a sense of loyalty and solidarity. Thus, by advocating
equal rights the military could be enabled to effectively reduce separatist tendencies
and become a reliable and coherent force.
91 E.g. code enforcement complaints procedure, German military: Wehrbeschwerdeordnung, WBO:
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/wbo/ ; http://www.deutsches-wehrrecht.de/Beschwerderecht.pdf.
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2) Integration of Sahwa fighters
As the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government’s current negative approach towards
Sahwas fuels tensions between the two major religious groups in Iraq, the
government immediately needs to strive for reconciliation to avoid any further
commotion.
Accordingly, the Iraqi government has to guarantee the incorporation of
20.000 Sahwa fighters into the ISF as promised to restore confidence in government
authorities and to bring forward the integration process. The effectual integration of
Sahwa members in the Iraqi military will be instrumental in improving Sunni-Shi´a
relations fundamentally as it not only substantiates the readiness of the Iraqi
government to equally share military power, but also demonstrates the willingness to
act jointly on a political level in the future as well.
Additionally, an independent investigation committee subordinated to the Iraqi
parliament should be constituted to scrutinize recent arrest warrants that were issued
against high-ranking Sahwa members. In cases of wrongful imprisonment the Iraqi
government should issue their immediate release and provide adequate
compensation.
Moreover, while the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is incapaple of action due to a
widespread infestation with sectarianism especially among police authorities the ISF
is keeping a superabundance of dispensable police forces. Therefore, it is
recommendable to initiate substantial downsizing of police forces and rather
incorporate respective numbers of Sahwa figthers into the Iraqi military not only
because Sahwa fighters have been most effective in fighting AQI but because they
also largely enjoy the confidence of the Sunni population. This public
acknowledgement will be considerably valuable both for counterterrorism operations
and intelligence support.
As a matter of course Sahwa aspirants have to be subject to extensive
scrutiny in terms of their maintenance history to guard against the hazard of
subversive infiltration. Respective investigations and the gathering of vital
background information should again be conducted by a special military intelligence
unit directed and supervised by an independent government commission in order to
ensure their diligence and effectiveness.
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